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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue crucial to this appeal is whether sufficient
evidence is before the trial judge to raise a material issue of
fact, thus making Summary Judgment improper.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, Myrna I. Martin, brought this medical
malpractice action against the defendants for negligence in
failing to diagnose and treat in a proper and timely manner
plaintiff's peripheral vascular disease.
Defendant, Richard Mott, moved for Summary Judgment.
The matter was heard before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier on
November 30, 1984.

On January 9, 1985 the court entered a Summary

Judgment in favor of defendant Mott and against plaintiff, finding
that plaintiff had not established by expert testimony that
defendant was negligent.

No other grounds for granting the

summary judgement are mentioned by the record of the lower court.
Plaintiff now Appeals from the judgement of the district court.
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's decision
granting defendant a Summary Judgment.

The relief sought is based

on facts which show that plaintiff did have evidence sufficient to
establish Mott's negligence and that the Order of the lower court
was improper.
Plaintiff was a patient of Dr. Mott, a podiatrist, from
May 12, 1980 to June 3, 1980.

The care involved numerous office

visits and examinations of plaintiff conducted by Dr. Mott (Mott
Deposition Exhibit " 1 " ) .

On or about June 3, 1980, plaintiff was

seen by Dr. Gordon R. Kimball, an orthopedic surgeon, who
immediately diagnosed peripheral vascular disease and who
immediately thereafter operated on plaintiff in an attempt to
correct her circulatory problem (Mott Deposition, Exhibit "2";
Martin Deposition, p. 33-35).
-2-

During the time Dr. Mott treated plaintiff, the
plaintiff presented Dr. Mott with several easily recognizable
symptoms of peripheral vascular disease (Mott Deposition, P. 31,
line 21 to p.32, line 9; p.44, lines 10-21; p. 46 line 10 to p.47,
line 2 [regarding the so-called "rest pain"]; p. 20, lines 5-13;
Exhibit "1"; [regarding pain felt by plaintiff]; p.20, line 19 to
p. 22, line 2 [regarding plaintiff's pallor and paresthesia],
Exhibit 1, line 21; p. 33, line 5; p. 44, line 22 to page 45, line
20 [regarding tingling and numbness felt by plaintiff]).

During

Dr. Mott's care of plaintiff, he never diagnosed the peripheral
vascular disease that was diagnosed by Dr. Kimball on June 3, 1980
(Mott deposition, exhibits 1 and 2 ) .

Dr. Mott had, prior to the

time he was consulted by plaintiff, referred other patients to
vascular surgeons for treatment of peripheral vascular disease
that he had recognized (Mott Deposition p. 21, line 16 to p. 22,
line 11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff argues that there is plenty of evidence before
the district court to raise an issue of fact as to the defendant's
negligence.

The plaintiff's expert witness was competent to

testify of the defendant's negligence since both practice in
similar fields of the healing arts.

The plaintiff's witness also

knew the standard of care applicable to the defendant since his
practice as a physician includes the field of the defendant's
practice of podiatry.

-3-

ARGUMENT
I.

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT TO RENDER GRANTING OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT INAPPROPRIATE.

The issue crucial to this appeal is whether sufficient
evidence is before the trial judge to raise a material issue of
fact, thus making Summary Judgment improper.

At the hearing Dr.

W. Fleming, a medical doctor, by deposition had expressed his
opinion that the defendant's failure to diagnose peripheral
vascular disease was negligence.

Defendant argues that since Dr.

Fleming quite candidly admitted that he was not intimately
acquainted with the standard of care of podiatrists, then the
plaintiff has failed to provide competent expert testimony
regarding the negligence of Dr. Mott.

What the Defendant and the

trial court have failed to recognize is that podiatrists and
physicians practice in the same field of medicine as respects the
human foot.

Section 58-5-12, Utah Code Annotated (1977

amendment), defines the practice of podiatry as follows:

Any person shall be held to be practicing
chiropody who examines, diagnoses or treats,
medically, mechanically or surgically, the
ailments of the human foot, or massages in
connection there with.
The statute goes on to say:
. . . and nothing in this chapter shall
prohibit . . . the practice of podiatry by
physicians and surgeons . . .
Thus a physician may practice podiatry without any
-4-

further licensing.

As a qualified practicioner in the field, Dr.

Fleming is by definition familier with the applicable standard of
practice.

Dr. Mott's testimony is significant in this context.

At the time of his deposition, he asserted that "Basically, I'm a
physician and surgeon on the foot and foot specialist.
Deposition, p. 3, lines 17-18, emphasis added.)

(Mott

A few moments

later, Dr. Mott was asked about the scope of his training as a
podiatrist:

Q: Does the training of a podiatrist include
alerting him to the signs and symptoms that
may include systemic disease of various types?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Exhibit itself in the lower extremities?

A:

Uh-huh.

Q: And is peripheral vascular disease among
those?
A:

Yes.

Q: As well as various other types of ailments
and circulatory disorders?
A: Yes.
12-22).

(Mott deposition, p. 8, lines

Dr. Mott himself concedes that he is basically a
physician and surgeon of the foot.

It logically follows that he

considers himself bound to comply with the standards applicable to
a physician and surgeon as respects the foot.

Since he

specializes in the ailments of the foot, he should be able to
recognize the signs and symptoms of diseases which manifest
themselves in the foot, particularly crippling and painful
-5-

conditions such as peripheral vascular disease.

Since Dr. Fleming

is also a physician and surgeon whose practice includes those same
ailments of the foot which the podiatrist addresses, he is by
definition familiar with the standards applicable to such
practice.

This is true even though the physician and surgeon may

not consider himself a "podiatrist."

Dr. Fleming has testified

that Dr. Mott's performance was deficient from the standpoint of a
physician and surgeon.

The condition involved the foot, and Dr.

Mott considers himself to be a physician and surgeon as respects
the foot.

Dr. Fleming's opinion is based not only on defendant's

failure to recognize the disease but also upon his innappropriate
treatment.

II.

A PHYSICIAN IS QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT
WITNESS IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE HEALING ARTS.

In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67P.2d 654, 92 Utah 312,
(1937), the Supreme Court held that a practitioner licensed to
practice medicine in all its branches is qualified to testify as
an expert witness in all fields of medicine.

In this case, the

defendant chiropractor appealed from a judgment entered by the
trial court against him, citing as error, inter alia, that
plaintiff's expert witnesses, who were physicians, should not have
been allowed to testify since they "admitted that they had not
studied 'chiropractic' and either had no knowledge or only a
superficial knowledge thereof."

67 P.2d 654 at 666.

noted:
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The Court

Under the Utah statute, a practitioner
licensed to practice medicine is, if the trial
court finds from the evidence that he is such
practitioner, possessing the qualifications
required of a practitioner of medicine in all
its branches, qualified to testify as an
expert in a malpractice case charging
negligence in diagnosing or negligent
treatment of human ailments.
67 P.2d 654, at 664 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has therefore held as a matter of
law that a physician is competent in Utah to testify concerning a
chiropractor's negligence.

This position applies equally to

another limited field of the healing arts, that of podiatry.

Many

other jurisdictions also recognize physicians as experts for other
branches of the healing arts.

Where principles, techniques,

methods, practices or procedures of one branch concur or are
generally the same as those of another branch, the testimony of
one branch is admissable.
1981).

Creasey v. Hogan, 637 P.2d 114, (Oregon

Sutton v. Cook, 458 P.2d 402, (Oregon 1969).

Even if the

standard of care between the two healing arts do not totally
agree, a witness can still testify on those points which do or
should concur to show the applicable standard of care.
v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, (Arizona 1980).
P.2d 326, (Arizona 1978).

Fridena

Gaston v. Hunter, 588

Dr. Fleming is a competent expert

witness as to the standard of care used by Dr. Mott in the
diagnosis and treatment of

a disease which affects the foot.

Dr. Mott himself admitted that he should have diagnosed
plaintiff's peripheral vascular disease, but inexplicably failed
to do so.

That admission is competent evidence that defendant was

negligent and should certainly justify submission to the trier of
-7-

fact.

See Martin deposition, P. 87, line 22 to p. 88, line 5.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's expert testimony is sufficient to establish

a material issue of fact with regard to Dr. Mottfs negligence and
plaintiff's resultant injury.
The issue for determination on this appeal is whether a
medical doctor called to testify on plaintiff's behalf is
competent to offer his opinion regarding a defendant podiatrist's
standard of care. This court resolved that question in the
Walkenhorst case nearly fifty years ago, affirmatively.
Appellant submits that Summary Judgment of dismissal
entered by the lower court was error under Utah law and that the
same should be reversed and the case be remanded for further
proceedings.

DATED this

?r

day of June, 1985.

ANTHONY M. THURBER
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Attached is a copy of the trial court's order of
summary judgment dated January 9, 1985 from which order this
appeal is taken.
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DAVID G. WILLIAMS - A3481
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Mott
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MYRNA I. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

RICHARD C. MOTT, STEVEN D.
TAYLOR, JAMES WILFERT,
DAVID BURTON, INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba THE COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL, and JOHN DOES
I through X,

Civil No.

C-81-8421

Judge Philip R, Fishier

Defendants.

Defendant Mottfs Motion for Summary Judgment having come
on regularly for hearing on November 30, 1984, and all parties
having been represented at said hearing by counsel, and the
Court having heard arguments from counsel and having reviewed
memoranda filed by plaintiff and defendant Mott, and the Court
having concluded that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and being fully advised and having issued its Memorandum

Decision,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary
Judgment, no cause of action, be and the same is hereby entered
in favor of defendant Richard G. Mott and against plaintiff
Myrna I. Martin.
DATED this

V

day of ^- J^- » l
BY THE COURT:

57
Philip R. Fishier
District Judge
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